When allied governments commit resources or make pledges, the level of support Washington provides tends to shift accordingly — a reciprocal calculation that has come to define how Trump approaches foreign relations. Aid flowed from Israel to its partners, and backing came back in kind. Joint operations with the United States in Iran formed part of Israel's record, alongside intelligence contributions and a demonstration of the military attributes that factor into alliance assessments by Washington.
In April, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth conveyed appreciation to Israeli forces, describing them in a statement as a committed and capable partner in the ongoing military operations. Observers around the world, including nations regarded as allied, took note of what the demonstration of those capabilities represented.
Among Washington's longstanding treaty partners — NATO members and South Korea among them — contributions have remained well below the benchmark set by that example. Those partners have faced consequences extending beyond diplomatic friction. Joint military drills with South Korea were scaled back at Trump's direction, a move attributed to Seoul's position on the Iran campaign, while Madrid's decision not to grant Washington access to its bases for strikes on Iran drew a trade threat from Trump toward Spain.
The broader narrative around this story extends to Saudi Arabia as well. Questions about why the United States has stopped short of direct involvement in the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Houthi forces have drawn considerable debate among observers. A missile struck King Khalid Airport in Riyadh on Saturday, killing 12 people and injuring more than 300 others, making it the deadliest attack on Saudi territory in around a decade. Three attacks unfolded in the span of a week ending that Saturday, each tied to a period of mounting friction between Saudi Arabia and Houthi forces that had been building since Saudi Arabia launched a military operation aimed at driving Houthi fighters away from the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Trump's position on the matter has shifted over time. Intelligence sharing and targeting support have been extended by the administration, though a move toward direct military involvement has not yet taken place. Speaking to reporters that Saturday, he indicated he was weighing a potential role in the Saudi-led strikes.
Two factors were put forward to account for the restraint: an unwillingness to enter another large-scale military campaign with the midterm elections fewer than four weeks away, and concern over weapons stocks drawn down by the war in Iran. One theory that has been put forward attributes the tension to Trump's reported dissatisfaction over Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's position on the Abraham Accords, which the Saudi leader has not moved to join.
A Saudi-Israeli normalisation agreement was among the diplomatic outcomes that analysts viewed as potentially valuable to Trump ahead of the election period. A nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia was formalised in July, with the arrangement positioning American companies to pursue a substantial commercial presence in the kingdom's emerging nuclear sector. Trump's position, as conveyed at the time, made any forward movement contingent on Saudi Arabia's entry into the Abraham Accords.
Formal diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel have been described by analysts as among the most sought-after outcomes in regional foreign policy, though the prospects and timeline for such an agreement remain contested. In a detailed interview published by Israel Hayom, Avi Gil — who previously served as military secretary to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — put forward the view that Israel's pursuit of a Saudi Arabian agreement under the Abraham Accords framework contributed to a more measured posture toward Hamas and Hezbollah in the period before October 7. Efforts to keep the normalisation process on track shaped how Israel approached the risk of further escalation.
The two nations were described as being nearer to an agreement than outside observers might expect. The negotiations continued on their intended course, unaffected by the military operations carried out by Israel. The decision to proceed was one Hamas reached on its own.
Saudi Arabia's position, maintained consistently since that period, has been that normalisation of ties with Israel — even as Tehran's regional influence expanded and a broader security framework made such a step strategically plausible — would not proceed without a credible route toward Palestinian statehood. A gap endures between what defence planners might prefer and what any Israeli government could plausibly agree to, with formal recognition of a Palestinian state remaining an unlikely prospect in the near term given the lasting impact of the October 7 attacks on public and political sentiment.
Shared adversarial pressure from Iran and the armed factions operating under Tehran's umbrella has placed both Israel and Saudi Arabia in a comparable strategic position. Shared concerns about Houthi actions against vessels, air infrastructure, and broader regional order give both parties a common stake in addressing those threats. Where overlapping interests exist between the parties, those points of alignment have been cited as supporting the case for working together. Those factors proved insufficient to clear the way toward formalising an open relationship between the two sides.
A trilateral defence agreement, concluded with Pakistan and Turkey that August, offered a clearer picture of the regional security framework Riyadh was working to build. At the same time, ties with two fellow Muslim-majority nations were being deepened through a separate diplomatic channel, with the Saudi-Israeli relationship kept out of public view. Under the agreement, any hostile act directed at one signatory would obligate the others to treat it as an act of war against themselves.
The measures taken against the Houthi campaign have not matched the strength of the language used to characterise them. Reports indicate that Turkey has taken steps to supply defensive equipment and technical support, though that assistance falls short of active participation alongside Saudi Arabia in military operations against the force carrying out the attacks. The agreement's signing pointed to Saudi Arabia pursuing broader security arrangements through other channels, even as it kept its intelligence ties with Israel active and out of public view.
A foiled attempt by an Omani pilot to bring down a flydubai aircraft carrying Israeli passengers at Ben-Gurion Airport — stopped by those aboard — offered one data point in an ongoing effort to understand the nature of Saudi-Israeli relations at that moment. At Tabuk's civilian-military airfield, the aircraft in distress was permitted to land, and medical personnel on the Saudi side attended to Israeli passengers aboard — two forms of practical support extended at a point of considerable risk. Saudi Arabia's position was that Israeli aircraft would not be authorised to collect the passengers. Passengers made the return journey aboard a substitute flydubai aircraft.
The boundary between cooperating on practical matters and extending broader public support became apparent. Permitting an Israeli aircraft to transport those passengers would have carried the weight of a concrete step toward normalisation — a concession that broad segments of Saudi society were likely to view with opposition, and one that groups aligned with Iran could have been expected to turn into a political liability for Riyadh. An unacknowledged boundary held firm along the lines of the negotiations, restricting how far the parties were prepared to extend their cooperation.
A strike against an airport on Saudi soil followed ten days on, prompting Riyadh to seek coalition support in its armed confrontation with Houthi forces. Observers noted that the incident prompted discussion about whether security ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia — long conducted out of public view — might move toward a more visible arrangement, given the two countries' overlapping interest in countering a common threat. Analysts have argued that reducing the Houthis' capacity for armed action would align with the strategic interests of both Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Having a common opponent does not, on its own, translate into coordinated forces taking the field together. Any open role for Israel in the operation carries the potential to draw diplomatic repercussions for Riyadh, while also lending weight to the view that the campaign serves Israeli interests ahead of Saudi ones. Any decision by Saudi leadership on whether to accept the assistance would require weighing the potential drawbacks against whatever advantages it offered. Any arrangement between the two countries would require Israel to weigh the potential risks of acting on Saudi Arabia's behalf against what it might reasonably gain from such an agreement.
Riyadh now faces a recalibration of its regional posture, with the airport attack prompting a reassessment of whether keeping one of its more capable neighbouring partners at arm's length still aligns with its own strategic calculations. The concessions Israel might offer remain a delicate calculation, given that Saudi Arabia has yet to demonstrate any readiness to accept such terms in a public forum.
