The platform has expanded well beyond its origins as a tool for transferring funds, and now functions as foundational infrastructure for the digital economy. Data released by the National Payments Corporation of India showed that UPI handled roughly 24.51 billion individual transfers during August alone, with the combined value of those transactions reaching ₹29.82 trillion.
Under the revised framework taking effect on 15 October, a merchant discount rate of 0.4% applies to qualifying person-to-merchant payments exceeding ₹2,000, with the charge ceiling set at ₹300 once a transaction reaches ₹75,000. Transfers between individuals attract no charge, and the same applies to payments at or below ₹2,000 as well as any transactions that fall within the zero-MDR framework covering smaller merchants. Forecasts put the share of person-to-merchant transactions left undisturbed at roughly 96 out of every hundred.
A zero-MDR policy took effect at the start of 2020, removing transaction fees across the payments landscape while establishing a reimbursement mechanism for those operating within the ecosystem. Between FY22 and FY25, the total backing channelled through government funding reached around ₹8,730 crore.
The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance flagged a pronounced gap between industry-derived running costs for the UPI ecosystem — placed at roughly ₹20,700 crore per year — and a government budget line of ₹2,000 crore for FY2026-27, noting the disparity between what operators say the network costs to run and what public funds have been set aside to cover it. Figures drawn from the available data point to costs that are not reflected in the pricing of transactions advertised as free.
Operating a UPI platform draws on a broad set of resources — server capacity, data transmission infrastructure, cybersecurity protocols, fraud oversight mechanisms, banking systems, and ongoing technical assistance. Speed and ease have become defining features of modern payment habits, yet the infrastructure underpinning those transactions draws on ongoing investment from both regulators and industry participants to maintain security standards. The question of which parties absorb those expenses remains an open matter of debate.
Handling physical currency carries its own set of expenses. Retailers take on the obligation of storing and securing physical currency, while those who shop bear the expense and exposure that come with handling and withdrawing it.
One way to understand MDR is as a fee distributed across participants in the digital-payment ecosystem, rather than a burden placed exclusively on the merchant side of a transaction. Where two distinct groups depend on one another through a shared platform, offering discounted terms to one group can be economically justified — drawing that group in raises the platform's worth to the other. Shoppers gain access to a broader network of participating retailers, while those same retailers tap into a growing pool of customers who pay digitally.
Beyond a certain adoption level, the administrative cost of maintaining the underlying systems begins to outpace whatever marginal value each new discounted transaction can realistically deliver. A shift in the country's economic orientation appears to be under way, with long-term sustainability displacing earlier priorities centred on uptake and adoption.
Under the revised MDR framework, fees on higher-value merchant transactions would rise while payments of smaller amounts — along with merchants operating at that scale — would remain exempt. Pricing structures built on this framework push charges upward wherever demand holds firm regardless of cost, then ease them downward in markets where buyers adjust their behaviour noticeably when prices shift.
Relying on transaction value alone leaves meaningful gaps when trying to gauge how buyers actually respond to price shifts. Spending ₹3,000 at a large retailer carries a different weight for the broader economy than the same amount spent at a small business operating on thin margins. Transaction size alone does not determine how much of a payment fee a party can comfortably bear.
Analysts have argued that any framework worth adopting would weigh annual turnover, how often transactions occur, the profit margins typical of a given sector, and reliance on digital payment methods — not just the size of individual transactions.
Where MDR falls as a legal obligation on merchants, the actual economic burden need not land in the same place. Four paths are open to merchants for managing the expense: absorbing it outright, trimming promotional offers, steering customers toward preferred payment methods, or folding a portion into their product pricing. How much of that cost lands on consumers hinges on how responsive buying and selling behaviour each prove to be when prices shift.
Banning the direct transfer of MDR costs to consumers addresses which party bears legal liability, yet that rule alone cannot dictate where the financial burden ultimately lands in practice. In industries where profit margins run narrow, the stakes of such decisions weigh noticeably heavier.
While UPI's underlying infrastructure allows different systems to connect with one another, the apps that consumers actually use to make payments remain dominated by a handful of players. Where MDR grows into a meaningful income source, platforms operating at greater scale would find themselves better positioned to fund customer acquisition drives, sweeten deals for merchants, and expand into adjacent financial products. Measures aimed at putting finances on a more stable footing may produce side effects that work against competitive balance.
Observers have pointed to two structural considerations worth examining: whether MDR revenue flows are shared openly among those operating within the ecosystem, and whether competitive oversight at the application layer remains in place.
Proponents of channelling generated funds toward cybersecurity infrastructure, research and development work, operational resilience, and innovation efforts have also called for driving UPI uptake and expanding its footprint into untapped markets. The policy architecture under discussion rests on four guiding principles: a zero-rate MDR on person-to-person transfers and genuinely small-scale merchant activity; MDR pricing anchored to actual costs and subjected to scheduled reviews carried out by independent auditors; merchant pricing structures rebuilt around a blend of annual turnover, the margin profiles typical to each sector, and transaction frequency rather than the value of any single payment; and partial classification of UPI as public infrastructure.
Proponents argue that UPI warrants that partial classification on the grounds that its advantages — among them reduced costs tied to handling physical currency, broader formalisation of economic activity, greater visibility into payment flows, and productivity gains across the wider economy — extend beyond what any individual private participant stands to internalise.
The question at hand involves more than a straightforward either/or between a no-cost UPI model and one that carries fees. Free access to services has been linked, in the case of one populous nation, to the rapid spread of user adoption across platforms and networks. Keeping the network on solid financial footing without undermining existing adoption levels stands as the next challenge identified by those examining the framework.
The argument advanced by proponents holds that pricing decisions ought to follow a tiered logic: levying charges where buyers show little sensitivity to cost, directing public funds toward activities whose broader benefits outweigh private returns, guarding market openness wherever network effects concentrate power in few hands, and deploying government spending where society as a whole stands to gain.