Three military chiefs of staff — representing Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan — gathered in Riyadh on Sept. 25 to address questions around the Mecca agreement's trajectory alongside shared concerns in defence and security. The military leaders renewed pledges to uphold collective defence and backed expanding the agreement into an operational security architecture designed to safeguard Saudi Arabia's borders and national sovereignty against threats that have included cross-border Houthi strikes.

When the three nations convened again on Oct. 5, their earlier commitment took on a more concrete and binding form. At a meeting of defence and foreign ministers from the three nations, backing for Saudi Arabia was formally renewed, while Türkiye and Pakistan each pledged to deploy agreed military forces and capabilities to the kingdom, contingent on approved arrangements and their respective domestic legal frameworks.

Three nations — Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan — put their signatures to the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement in August, an accord built around the shared aim of bolstering mutual deterrence and easing instability across the region. Each nation contributes a distinct form of leverage to the arrangement: Saudi Arabia through its wealth and regional standing, Türkiye through the depth of its defence-industrial base and armed forces, and Pakistan through both its military capacity and the diplomatic channel it holds open with Iran.

Beyond the raw numbers — nearly 1.4 million active troops, roughly 3,400 aircraft, some 6,000 tanks, and upwards of 340 naval vessels spread across the three allied nations — analysts have identified considerations that hardware tallies alone do not capture regarding what the pact means for the kingdom's strategic thinking in Yemen. Analysts have identified two areas worth considering: the first centres on contesting the ideological foundations the Houthis use to justify their regional standing, while the second positions Pakistan to exert leverage through its existing ties with Iran.

Following the October 7 attacks, the Houthis have framed their armed campaign against Saudi Arabia and other regional actors as part of a wider conflict encompassing both Israel and the United States. Publicly, those operations have been characterised by some as acts of solidarity with Palestine rather than as a continuation of Yemen's internal conflict. That messaging enabled the Houthis to reach beyond their local political and territorial roots, casting themselves as part of a broader struggle shared across the Muslim world. Beyond offsetting internal vulnerabilities — among them economic strain, failures of governance, and gaps in the delivery of basic services — the movement has drawn on this avenue as a tool for reinforcing its standing at home.

Named after a city that carries religious weight across much of the Muslim world, the pact draws Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan into a formal alignment built around defence cooperation and shared regional interests. Whether the Mecca agreement poses a tension with the Houthi account is a matter analysts continue to weigh.

The Houthi framing of Saudi Arabia as an instrument of Israeli or American regional interests runs into difficulty when the positions of Türkiye and Pakistan are taken into account, according to analysts. On the question of Palestine, each of the two nations has taken a firm and consistent stance, repeatedly voicing objections to Israeli military conduct in Gaza. At the United Nations in 2026, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan characterised Israel's actions as state terrorism, a position consistent with his long-standing public statements on the Palestinian cause, which drew international attention as far back as the 2009 Davos summit.

Analysts have noted that the Houthis face competing pressures that pull toward incompatible stances. Their regional positioning has rested partly on framing the standoff with Saudi Arabia as one thread in a wider contest involving Israel and its allied powers. Where Saudi Arabia coordinates its position with Türkiye and Pakistan — both of which hold independently established stances on Palestine — that framing becomes harder to sustain on its own terms, according to analysts. Houthi strikes against Saudi Arabia may add further strain to their position as a voice for Muslim solidarity on the Palestinian issue, a standing already called into question by accusations that they have targeted sites considered sacred in Islam.

Pakistan's dual positioning — maintaining open diplomatic lines with Tehran while also holding a seat within the Mecca agreement framework — places the country at a junction that some analysts view as potentially useful for regional dialogue, though the extent of that leverage remains a matter of debate. Pakistan's role in the wider standoff touching on Iran took shape through the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and the rounds of dialogue with Tehran that followed from it. Islamabad has pointed to its established channels with Tehran as a resource for lowering tensions across the broader region. Prime Minister Sharif's involvement in the talks has been described as a contributing factor in moving the mediation forward, with his participation in the negotiations continuing.

Iran stands as the primary external source of support for the Houthis, though the precise degree to which the government in Tehran steers the group's decisions remains a matter of ongoing debate among those who study the relationship. The diplomatic ties between Pakistan and Iran open a secondary pathway — one that stops short of demanding a shift in Iranian policy, yet still gives outside actors a means to engage Tehran, apply measured pressure, or invite it to curb Houthi activity.

Analysts have noted that the Mecca agreement's significance in Yemen warrants assessment against a wider set of criteria than the combined military assets — aircraft, soldiers, and hardware — that Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are able to field together. Two areas drawing less public attention — the standing the Houthis hold among those who view them as a legitimate political force, and the negotiating pathways through which outside parties might shape their conduct — stand to be affected more deeply, according to analysts. A diplomatic configuration linking Saudi Arabia with two countries that each carry standing as advocates for Muslim political concerns could, in turn, bear on how the Houthis' own narrative of resistance is received and contested. Pakistan's diplomatic ties with Iran open a back-channel through which some degree of influence over the movement may be exercised indirectly, analysts have said.