The conflict in Yemen has become part of a broader regional struggle. Houthi fighters advanced along Yemen's western coastline in September, pushing back troops loyal to the country's internationally recognised administration. Mokha harbour came under their authority before the advance continued southward, bringing Perim Island — situated at the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait — within their control.

The group has since expanded its presence along Yemen's Red Sea coastline, placing one of the world's most heavily trafficked shipping lanes under prolonged pressure. Strikes extending beyond Yemeni territory have accompanied the broader military campaign. Houthi forces escalated their assault on Saudi Arabia, while a drone attack traced back to Iraq left three pumping stations along the kingdom's East-West oil pipeline out of operation.

The route had gained strategic value by enabling Saudi oil exports to reach Red Sea terminals while circumventing the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway facing elevated security risks. Airstrikes targeting Houthi positions have been launched by Saudi Arabia, while the resumption of hostilities has forced over 112,000 people to flee their homes within Yemen.

Areas under Houthi control sit at a strategic position above the strait connecting the Indian Ocean to the Suez Canal route, a chokepoint for international shipping. A non-state armed faction has established a presence over territory bordering one of the world's most heavily trafficked and strategically positioned maritime corridors.

At its narrowest stretch, the Bab el-Mandeb strait spans roughly 30 kilometres, forming a channel between Yemen on one side and Djibouti and Eritrea on the other. Vessels heading northward through the strait feed into the Suez Canal route, placing the waterway along one of the most direct sea passages linking Asia and Europe. Dominance over a naval strait does not depend on intercepting every vessel that transits the waterway.

Vessels rerouted away from the Bab el-Mandeb strait must navigate around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa, extending certain routes by thousands of kilometres. Greater distances translate into elevated fuel expenditure, steeper insurance and freight charges, and extended delivery timelines for shipments.

From late 2023 onwards, the organisation began firing missiles and drones at cargo ships traversing the Red Sea, claiming at the time to be directing attacks at vessels with ties to Israel in response to the conflict in Gaza. Numerous shipping operators redirected their fleets along the Cape of Good Hope route, as vessel movements through the Suez Canal declined considerably. Achieving that outcome did not require the Houthis to destroy every vessel or seal the strait entirely.

The group's recently expanded territorial foothold borders the strait directly, a position that analysts have noted may strengthen its negotiating hand considerably.

Stretching approximately 1,200 kilometres across the Arabian Peninsula, the East-West Pipeline transports crude from eastern oil fields to the Red Sea terminal at Yanbu. The route had been transporting between four and five million barrels of oil each day, accounting for approximately four to five percent of total worldwide supply. Three pumping stations along the pipeline sustained damage in a drone strike launched from Iraqi territory, halting operations temporarily and interrupting crude oil shipments out of Yanbu.

Daily throughput at the Bab el-Mandeb strait reached 8.1 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products during the second quarter of 2026, roughly double the volume recorded over the same period the previous year. Crude oil shipments via Oman have been increased by Saudi Arabia as efforts to restore pipeline capacity continue, with commodity markets showing signs of stabilisation. These developments have drawn attention to the risks of transferring reliance from one supply bottleneck to another.

Iran has supplied the Houthi movement with armaments, technical assistance, and other resources over an extended period, enabling the group to build the missile and drone capabilities that underpinned its Red Sea operations. The group maintains its own command structure, pursues distinct territorial objectives, and holds independent motivations for its armed campaign within Yemen. Iranian support for Houthi forces stops well short of directing every operational choice made by the group's leadership.

Iran's position along the Strait of Hormuz provides it with notable influence over maritime traffic moving through the Persian Gulf. An armed group able to strike vessels at the far reaches of the Arabian Peninsula draws geopolitical focus toward an altogether separate region. Iran has the capacity to influence activity at the strait without committing its own military personnel or formally restricting maritime traffic.

The Houthis retain the capacity to inflict pressure through ballistic weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, and the prospect of continued strikes, while Iran maintains a degree of separation from those operations. That geographic separation also constrains Tehran's influence, given that an independent Houthi decision to intensify hostilities might serve Iranian interests while simultaneously drawing Iran into an armed confrontation it had not sought. While ties to Iran carry regional weight, the two cannot be treated as one and the same entity.

Their position derives an advantage that armed force alone cannot provide: territorial location. Events in the Red Sea from 2023 onward demonstrated that shipping firms began seeking alternative routes well before any physical obstruction of waterways took place.