Discussions proceeded sequentially among Iran and Oman, Oman and Qatar, Iran and Saudi Arabia, then Qatar and Saudi Arabia, seeking to establish parameters for regional coexistence in the post-conflict period. This heightened pace of diplomatic engagement represents an initial phase, with additional discussions anticipated as regional states adjust their relations with Iran.

Talks have addressed management of shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz and potential economic arrangements the Gulf states might offer Iran for security-related commitments. This development occurs in parallel with, though distinct from, current talks between Washington and Tehran aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement before the end of August, according to a Middle East Institute senior fellow who noted that trust in American diplomatic commitments has eroded over an extended period. Observers suggest Gulf states may independently negotiate arrangements with Tehran rather than relying on external frameworks.

Officials stated that the boundary would constitute a non-negotiable threshold, according to an analyst from the research institute. Gulf officials and analysts have also noted that they believe Iran views this as its key leverage and that expectations regarding potential outcomes should remain grounded.

Sources indicate proposals are under consideration for a fee system to fund activities including mine clearance in the waterway, environmental protection measures, harbour operations and insurance coverage. The identity of the hosting organisation, the collection method for funds, and the ultimate recipients of disbursements remain unspecified. Tehran has begun implementing this policy, mandating through a recently established authority overseeing the strait that ships carry insurance from the country.

The arrangement is intended to take effect once the 60-day period concludes, during which the two nations seek to negotiate a more comprehensive deal. An analyst noted that Tehran has recognised the strategic value of the Hormuz waterway as a bargaining tool it can deploy at will, predicting that any settlement will allow it to maintain this advantage.

The president has consistently stated that no tolls would be permitted, making any reformulation of the charges unacceptable. Concerns have been raised about potential precedent, although an international maritime agreement prohibiting transit fees permits charges for particular services provided to vessels. The Gulf states might encounter few other options available to them.

Last week, the Revolutionary Guards communicated notices to vessels navigating the strait after Iran, Oman and the UN reached an accord on two passage corridors for ships unable to proceed. Iran stated that it maintains exclusive authority over specified maritime routes, cautioning that navigation beyond these designated paths is forbidden and poses substantial risk.

A day later, a shipping company based in Taiwan reported that one of its ships sustained damage in the strait from what officials in the United States identified as a drone strike attributed to Iran, marking the initial incident of this nature following the signing of a temporary ceasefire agreement between the two nations. The two nations subsequently engaged in reciprocal strikes that extended across Gulf territories. Both parties have since committed to suspending hostilities ahead of negotiations scheduled for Tuesday in Qatar.

A research institution based in the United States noted in its analysis that such Iranian actions may function as an indirect signal to nations in the Gulf region, including Oman, indicating that assaults on commercial vessels will persist without regional cooperation with Tehran.

According to research from the International Crisis Group, a non-profit organisation, Gulf nations had already been positioning themselves for potential shifts in regional dynamics even before recent hostilities, and are now pursuing independent diplomatic channels, with Saudi Arabia anticipated to facilitate wider security discussions and individual states holding bilateral meetings with Iran on Hormuz management. Iraq, whose economy relies heavily on oil shipments passing through the strait, represents another potential category.

Gulf states possess primarily economic influence through potential investment opportunities in Iran, whose economy faces substantial difficulties from both sanctions and conflict, according to an analyst who noted this financial vulnerability may become a key factor following hostilities. They intend to negotiate adjustments with Tehran aimed at diminishing risks to their nearby territories. Options being considered include placing restrictions on the number of missiles available to the nation and reducing support provided to affiliated armed groups, which conducted strikes on states in the Gulf region during the conflict.

The multiple parallel discussions taking place across Gulf states – occurring simultaneously with wider negotiations between Tehran and Washington – demonstrates how the region has moved away from depending chiefly on the US. Farouk noted that the US would continue to serve as the foundation of Gulf defence infrastructure and systems, having long dominated defence relationships and weapons sales in the area.

Procurement needs are shifting toward suppliers that can deliver equipment unavailable domestically or address specific regional security concerns, with this trend toward supply chain diversification already underway. Kuwait and Turkey agreed on a framework for acquiring unmanned aircraft and air defence equipment last May. Ukraine has also recently concluded agreements to supply drones to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, while Saudi Arabia has been participating in discussions within a newly formed grouping that includes Egypt, Pakistan and Turkey.

Trust in the United States has declined since the initial term of Mr Trump, especially following the 2018 withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran, after which Tehran incrementally reduced adherence to nuclear programme limitations. During the president's current tenure, military engagements with Iran on two occasions and indications of potential withdrawal from the Atlantic alliance have left numerous nations questioning whether written assurances from the administration hold substantive value.

However, they may continue seeking methods to rebuild trust, potentially similar to the 2025 executive order signed by Mr Trump regarding Qatar's security assurances. Nevertheless, officials in Gulf states recognise the need to operate independently of potential American support, given that reliance on it may prove counterproductive, according to an analyst.

Despite years of diplomatic engagement with Tehran – including the facilitation of restricted asset transfers by financial institutions in the UAE – Iran's regional activities have continued. This may raise even greater concerns should Iran's governing system undergo a shift toward more hardline policies. Previous administrations opted against blocking the Strait of Hormuz, though they possessed the capability to employ this strategic option.

Despite unfulfilled commitments, regional authorities in the Gulf are not expected to request the withdrawal of American forces from the area. However, they intend to develop alternative approaches should American commitments to security and defence cooperation prove unreliable, according to an analyst.