Confidential EU paperwork, obtained by a news organisation, reveals that bloc officials have been working to deepen engagement with Vietnam around access to the raw materials that feed European manufacturing and defence output — an effort shaped by the goal of reducing dependence on any single dominant source.
Funding for Vietnam's mining and mineral-processing sectors — covering tungsten, bismuth, antimony, and titanium — was among the proposals set out in an EU delegation document drawn up in Hanoi in June 2026, with the stated aim of broadening European access to those raw materials. Vietnam's deposits of rare earth minerals and other natural resources feature in the proposals as a potential pathway toward broadening the range of supply sources available to Europe.
According to those documents, Vietnam holds a place in Europe's defence planning that policymakers cannot set aside, particularly as the continent works to build up its military capacity and lessen reliance on China — a country that leads global output of several minerals considered essential to that effort. Trade curbs that took effect the previous year under Chinese policy reshaped procurement flows across Europe, feeding anxieties over the steady supply of raw inputs that defence manufacturers, technology developers, and industrial producers all depend on.
Broadening the bloc's access to raw materials deemed strategically vital has become a stated priority, and the envisaged arrangement would mark another move in that direction as rivalry over those resources grows.
Among its natural resources, Vietnam holds notable ground-level concentrations of tungsten, rare earth elements, antimony, bismuth, and bauxite. Recoverable as a secondary output from certain industrial processes, gallium holds its own place among materials considered strategically valuable. Tungsten and antimony have nonetheless dominated the flow of Vietnamese goods into the EU market, with both minerals finding use in defence-related manufacturing processes — among them the production of ammunition and explosives.
Those EU documents call for sustained and broadened access to the materials in question, alongside the development of tighter working ties with Vietnam's processing sector. Financing options on offer span loans, grants, direct technical support, and export-credit insurance, with each instrument designed to underwrite activity across the mining and processing sectors.
Surveying Vietnam's mineral deposits with greater precision is among the priorities laid out in the documents, with the aim of producing more reliable estimates of how commercially viable those reserves might be. Having access to mineral deposits is only part of the equation — without the capacity to process them, dependable supply chains remain out of reach.
A country's position along the processing chain — converting raw materials into industry-ready forms — influences both the revenue it can claim and how manufacturers in Europe perceive it as a dependable supplier. Those documents indicate that channelling funds toward processing infrastructure may attract less political opposition than directing investment into mining operations outright, leaving an additional pathway through which Brussels could deepen its position in Vietnam's raw-materials supply chain.
A representative for the EU indicated that the European Commission had begun reviewing possible avenues for tangible collaboration with Vietnam in that industry.
Questions about mineral supply chains have gained renewed attention as Europe works to expand its defence capacity and stabilise its economic position — with data pointing to a notable concentration of sourcing for several key raw materials in China. Restrictions placed on mineral exports from China have demonstrated how disruptions within a supply network can extend far past the point of extraction, affecting industries that hold no direct connection to mining operations. Across industrial equipment, electronics, and defence applications alike, tungsten and other specialised materials sit at the heart of production chains that European manufacturers depend on for steady, uninterrupted operation.
Diversifying supply chains away from dependence on any single source sits at the heart of why engagement with Vietnam has grown in appeal for the EU. Trade ties on their own cannot deliver the breadth of diversification that broader structural shifts would require.
Rivalry for the same mineral deposits, processing infrastructure, and industrial alliances puts Europe in direct contention with a range of other nations. According to those documents, rivalry from allied nations could put established European supply chains under pressure, particularly where overseas investors take ownership positions in Vietnamese operations deemed strategically sensitive, or where output gets redirected toward other markets.
Contained within one EU document is an account of how entities based in Australia, the United States, and Canada fell short in their bid, pursued the previous year, to take a controlling ownership position in Masan High-Tech Materials, the company behind Vietnam's largest tungsten mining and processing operation. Sitting at the heart of the operation are both a mine and a processing refinery, with the output feeding tungsten demand across Europe — Germany among the most reliant buyers. Export volumes retreated over the course of the previous year, with processing delays and a climb in tungsten prices weighing on trade flows.
According to the document, the proposed takeover — attributed to Australian mining company EQ Resources — posed potential risks to existing European supply chains. A 4.99% ownership interest in Masan High-Tech Materials passed to Elmet Group through a transaction completed the previous month. Tungsten destined for the US defence stockpile is sourced through Elmet. Talks are also under way for the firm to offload an additional 5% ownership share to an overseas buyer based outside Europe.
EU documentation names both Lynas Rare Earths, the Australian mining company, and South Korea's LS Eco Energy as partners in a rare earth metals project that the filings describe as potentially leaving Europe at a competitive disadvantage. Feedstock brought in from abroad would serve as the raw material for rare earth metal output at the Vietnam-based facility.
Four categories of concern appear in the EU documentation for European investors: barriers posed by regulatory frameworks, hurdles at the political level, a lack of clarity around possible Chinese involvement, and protectionist tendencies within Vietnam's domestic economy. Obligations around the transfer of technology carry the potential to weigh on how businesses approach investment choices, especially where proprietary know-how is at stake.
Mineral cooperation talks between the EU and Vietnam fit within a broader diplomatic push aimed at deepening ties between the two sides. As of now, the EU's roster of 16 strategic partners on raw materials does not include Vietnam.
The deletion of Vietnam from the EU's tax-haven blacklist unfolded while Hanoi was still lobbying individual member states — France notable among the holdouts — to ratify a bilateral investment protection agreement struck back in 2019. Calls for the EU to remove its fisheries advisory have come from Vietnam as part of the broader trade discussions.
